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Preparing for a Bioterrorist Attack: 
Legal and Administrative Strategies
Richard E. Hoffman*
This article proposes and discusses legal and administra-
tive preparations for a bioterrorist attack. To perform the duties
expected of public health agencies during a disease outbreak
caused by bioterrorism, an agency must have a sufficient num-
ber of employees and providers at work and a good communi-
cations system between staff in the central offices of the public
health agency and those in outlying or neighboring agencies
and hospitals. The article proposes strategies for achieving
these objectives as well as for removing legal barriers that dis-
courage agencies, institutions, and persons from working
together for the overall good of the community. Issues related
to disease surveillance and special considerations regarding
public health restrictive orders are discussed.
his article proposes and discusses legal and administrative
strategies that state and local public health officers and
attorneys should consider when preparing for a bioterrorist
attack. Through thoughtful preparation, intelligent and enlight-
ened leadership can maximize coordination of available
resources in the community. 
Two predictable factors will dictate the manner in which
state and local governments respond to a bioterrorist attack:
1) the exposure will be covert, and an incubation period will
occur before ill persons seek medical care, i.e., there will not
be a single location for emergency response by emergency
medical teams, law enforcement officers, and firefighters as
there was in New York City and Washington, D.C., on Sep-
tember 11, 2001; and 2) the attack will be treated not only as
an epidemic but also as an emergency, a crime, and a matter of
national security. Because of the second factor, elected politi-
cal leaders will be in charge of  response to the attack, rather
than the health commissioner or the state epidemiologist,
either of whom would normally manage an epidemic or out-
break control activities. The president, governor, or mayor will
assume leadership roles, and public health agencies will need
to carry out their duties within an incident command structure.
The magnitude of a bioterrorist attack (i.e., how many per-
sons are exposed to the agent and how many become ill) and
the characteristics of the bioagent (e.g., contagious or not)
employed by the terrorists are not predictable, but these factors
will affect virtually all of the response activities. Nonetheless,
“generic” public health duties during a major bioterrorist
attack are predictable: providing accurate information to
health-care providers and the public about the status of the epi-
demic and protective measures; conducting disease surveil-
lance and contact tracing; administering vaccines or
prophylactic antibiotics; implementing restrictive measures;
analyzing human and environmental laboratory specimens;
and maintaining the quality of air, water, and food.
To perform these public health duties, two basic objectives
must be achieved: 1) a sufficient number of employees and
providers in state and local health agencies, hospitals, clinics,
and laboratories must show up for work; and 2) a good com-
munications system must exist between staff in the central
offices of the public health agency and those in outlying or
neighboring agencies and hospitals. Legal and administrative
strategies should be developed in advance of an attack with
these objectives in mind. 
“A sufficient number of employees and providers”
includes not only previously trained medical-care providers,
laboratory technicians, and public health epidemiologists but
also all untrained workers and volunteers who participate in
the response to the outbreak. Untrained does not mean
unskilled or untrainable. Untrained persons could come from
unrelated programs and departments within a public health
agency or hospital, from physicians practicing in the commu-
nity, and from volunteers within and outside the community. 
If the number of ill or exposed persons were large, the bio-
agent were contagious, or both, an epidemic could last for
weeks, and the demands on staff could be enormous. For
example, in response to a small number of smallpox cases in
New York City in 1947, the New York City Department of
Health gave smallpox vaccine to over 6 million residents by
operating 179 clinics from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. 7 days a
week for more than 3 weeks and by gaining the support of pri-
vate physicians, unions, and businesses (1). Before October
2001, no one in the United States. had experience with anthrax
transmitted through the mail or in the air of postal offices.
Many epidemiologic questions arose in the course of respond-
ing to that anthrax outbreak, and any future bioterrorist attack
will probably result in unpredictable or unimaginable issues
despite preparations and training that have been undertaken in
the past few years. Thus, the persons responding to an attack
will need flexibility in the statutes and regulations that govern
disaster emergencies. Rapidly amending statutes and regula-
tions by the usual legislative and administrative processes is
not feasible in an emergency; “flexibility” in this sense means
the legal authority manifest in statutes and regulations must
necessarily be nonspecific and allow for quick action by *University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver, Colorado, USA
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elected officials and public health leaders. Emergency or exec-
utive orders issued by the president, governor, or mayor are the
most straightforward legal method for directing response
activities customized to the details of a given attack. 
In the Colorado bioterrorism statute enacted in 2000, no
new powers were authorized for either the health department
director or the governor because existing authority to manage
emergencies, disasters, and epidemics, though long-standing,
was determined to have sufficient latitude to deal with the new
threat of bioterrorism. The overall purpose of the introduced
bill was to remove legal barriers that discouraged institutions
and persons from working together for the overall good of the
community. Because the introduced bill did not seek new pow-
ers, it was more acceptable to state legislators.
Obtaining Expert Advice
My experience in state government1 has been that after
natural or manmade point-source disasters, a governor reflex-
ively turns to the office of emergency management, the depart-
ment of public safety (or homeland security), or the National
Guard for advice and counsel. The staffs of these agencies,
however, have neither the expertise necessary to guide the
response to an epidemic nor an established, ongoing commu-
nications and surveillance system with hospitals, laboratories,
and medical providers. It is essential, therefore, to establish a
formal process that allows public health and medical experts to
assist elected officials in analyzing and interpreting informa-
tion about the outbreak and in coordinating the public health
response to the outbreak. Guidance for fiscal year 2002 sup-
plemental funds for public health preparedness and response
for bioterrorism issued by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) requires that a state establish an advisory
committee that includes representatives from health depart-
ments, first responders, hospitals, and voluntary organizations
such as the Red Cross (11). 
In Colorado this advisory committee includes not only the
nine groups listed in the CDC announcement but also the pres-
idents of the state board of health, state medical society, and
state hospital association; the state veterinarian; a wildlife dis-
ease specialist; a medical examiner; a specialist in posttrau-
matic stress management; a pharmacist member of the Board
of Pharmacy; the Attorney General; the chief public informa-
tion officer for the state health department; and, as an ex-offi-
cio member, the chief of the Colorado National Guard (3).
These persons were named to the committee because they pos-
sess useful expertise or connections to the community. The
statute authorizing the formation of the committee provided
legal immunity to members for their advice (4), and the mem-
bers pledged that they would attend the committee meetings
during a bioterrorist attack rather than report to their regular
jobs. By meeting regularly the committee members learn
about each other’s skills, experience, and roles and develop a
working relationship that, by itself, can be extremely valuable
during a crisis. 
One notable absence in the composition of the advisory
committee is representation from federal agencies, such as
CDC, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Although these agencies cannot, as a practical
matter, attend meetings in every state and large municipality,
during a crisis they will have an integral role, and disputes are
more likely if the leaders are meeting for the first time in a
highly stressful situation. For example, local-state-federal dis-
agreements occurred in the management of the pneumonic
plague epidemic in Los Angeles in 1924, the last instance of
person-to-person transmission of plague in the United States,
as well as during the anthrax outbreak in 2001 (12,13).
Removing Legal Barriers
Some existing state regulations, which in normal times are
intended to ensure quality medical care, could hinder commu-
nity efforts during a bioterrorist attack. For example, consider-
ation should be given to modifying, for a limited period
through executive orders, the regulations that control the pre-
scription and dispensing of medicine, licensing of physicians
and nurses, and transfer of patients between hospitals. Provid-
ing antibiotics or vaccinations in mass clinics and obtaining
the services of retired or out-of-state physicians and nurses
may be necessary. 
In Colorado, executive orders that address these concerns
have been drafted by the governor’s technical advisory com-
mittee. The orders would permit a) health-care providers other
than pharmacists and physicians, such as nurses and emer-
gency management technicians, to dispense medications,
b) medicines to be distributed without an identified patient’s
name on the packet or bottle, c) practice of medicine and nurs-
ing by professionals who are not currently licensed in Colo-
rado, provided the practice is restricted to caring for epidemic-
associated illnesses and the persons are working under the
supervision of a licensed practitioner (who is given legal
immunity for the supervisee’s work), and d) persons seeking
medical care at one facility to be redirected to another facility
without initial assessment or stabilization attempt if the initial
hospital is unable to care for any more persons or if a specific
facility (established or temporary) has been directed to receive
epidemic patients, e.g., those with smallpox. These draft
orders must still be tailored to the actual emergency and signed
by the governor, but the background legal work can be com-
pleted ahead of time. 
Two additional features of the Colorado bioterrorism stat-
ute exist; these features were designed to encourage volunteers
and remove legal barriers to cooperation among institutions
1My perspective is based on experience serving as the state epidemiol-
ogist for Colorado from 1987 to 2001; as its chief medical officer from
1998 to 2001; as a participant in Operation Topoff (a full-scale, federal-
state-county 4-day bioterrorism exercise conducted in May 2000) (2);
and as the principal author of Colorado’s bioterrorism response statute
(enacted March 2000) (3–8), its bioterrorism preparedness regulations
(adopted May 2001) (9), and its bioterrorism reporting regulations
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and agencies. First, the statutory definition of “civil defense
worker” was modified to include a “physician, health care pro-
vider, public health worker, or emergency medical service pro-
vider who is ordered by the governor…to provide specific
medical or public health services during and related to an
emergency epidemic and who complies with this order without
pay or other consideration” (7). With this amendment, civil
defense workers may receive compensation for injury, includ-
ing illness caused by bioterrorism, which is suffered as a result
of civil defense service. Second, the statute provides that “per-
sons and entities [including hospitals] that in good faith com-
ply completely with board of health rules regarding the
emergency epidemic and executive orders…shall be immune
from civil or criminal liability for any action taken to comply
with the executive order or rule” and that the state shall pro-
vide “compensation for property…if the property was com-
mandeered or otherwise used in coping with an emergency
epidemic… ” (4). 
Requiring Plans for Bioterrorist Events
To ensure that a sufficient number of health-care providers,
laboratory technicians, public health epidemiologists, and
administrative support workers show up for work during a bio-
terrorist attack, appropriate personal protection (e.g., respira-
tory protection, vaccination, or chemoprophylaxis) for the
worker and, probably, for household members of the worker
are essential. When performing nonstandard work, the worker
may also need legal protection, as discussed above. Plans for a
bioterrorist attack should include these factors and be written
by the employer who knows how the agency operates and is
staffed because people work for an agency, hospital, or institu-
tion, not a region. Nonetheless, it makes sense to develop
mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions and inte-
grate single institution or agency plans into community,
regional, or statewide plans. 
In the 2000 Colorado bioterrorism statute, the state board of
health was given the new authority to promulgate rules requir-
ing each state and local health department, general or critical
access hospital, and managed-care organization to write a plan
for responding to bioterrorism (7). Such rules were adopted in
May 2001 (8). While hospitals and health departments may
have previously written plans for managing mass casualties
resulting from aircraft, bus, or train crashes or natural disasters,
such plans need to be modified to include consideration of the
special circumstances of bioterrorism (e.g., chemoprophylaxis
and personal protective equipment for workers, infection con-
trol, and handling of laboratory specimens). Because pandemic
influenza may pose challenges to the medical and public health
systems similar to those of bioterrorism, a single plan for both
types of epidemics should be drafted. 
Ensuring Good Communications
During “typical” outbreaks of communicable diseases,
clear and timely communication by the state health department
with multiple local health departments and hospitals can be a
challenge. In a bioterrorist attack, the communications chal-
lenge will likely be greater because many more persons and
agencies will be involved. The telephone system may not have
sufficient capacity for the increased demand or it may be dam-
aged and disorganized, as happened during the response to the
attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York City in Sep-
tember 2001 (14). Furthermore, a large, sometimes over-
whelming, number of inquiries made by members of the
public to the public health agency usually occur during public
health crises, and therefore, administrative plans for a bioter-
rorist event should include consideration of this workload.
Legal and administrative strategies should be developed in
anticipation of communication challenges. Rather than relying
on hospital personnel, public health agencies may find it
advantageous to station their own personnel with mobile tele-
phone or radio communications equipment in individual hos-
pitals to assure that public health agencies get the information
they need as rapidly as possible. Accomplishing this may
require an executive order of the governor that commandeers
two-way radios. In Colorado, board of health regulations
require the state and local health departments to include
assignment of employees to hospitals in the agency’s emer-
gency plan (8). 
Disease Reporting and Surveillance
Disease reporting requires specification of what to report
in what manner and timeframe to which parties. A first legal
step in this process is to require immediate reporting of any
suspected or confirmed illness, syndrome, or outbreak caused
by any potential bioterrorist agent. For example, Colorado reg-
ulations were modified in 1999 so that cases of plague, which
had been required to be reported within 24 hours of diagnosis
by telephone, fax, or through a Web-based system, were to be
reported immediately only by telephone to an on-call person if
the physician or hospital suspected the case was related to a
bioterrorist event (9). 
Disease surveillance systems are critical not only for the
initial detection of an outbreak but also for monitoring the
extent and spread of the outbreak and for determining when it
is over. Managing a large outbreak would require gathering
information from contact tracing and source-of-exposure
investigations as well as information about the availability of
critical medicine, medical equipment, and the handling of
corpses. These information needs are much different than
those needed for early detection of an attack. Therefore, legal
authority for surveillance should be modified as necessary to
ensure collection of all information that could be needed by
the public health agency to fulfill its duties throughout the epi-
demic. This legal authority may include requirements for
groups that do not commonly report information, such as phar-
macists, to provide it. 
Restrictive Measures, Isolation, and Quarantine
Administrative public health orders restricting personal
behavior of persons with certain diseases, such as tuberculosis,PERSPECTIVE
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are relatively common in this country (15). Such orders are
usually hand-delivered to a specific person(s), and the restric-
tions are removed after a specified period, such as after one
incubation period or when an ill person is no longer infectious.
Another type of public health order might involve work
restriction, e.g., health-care providers who cannot demonstrate
evidence of immunity to a vaccine-preventable disease are not
permitted to work during an outbreak of such disease.
Few, if any states, however, have experience issuing and
enforcing large-scale quarantine orders that last more than 1–2
days. Orders restricting large numbers of contacts of cases of
plague to home were issued in Florence, Italy, in 1630 and
described in the 1999 book, Galileo’s Daughter  (16). The
enforcement of orders restricting the movement of residents of
an entire town in which there was an outbreak of viral hemor-
rhagic fever was depicted in the 1996 movie, Outbreak. The
images of severe disease and enforced quarantine are similar
in the book and movie and are plausible and disturbing to lay
audiences. A more recent, well-documented example of a
large-scale movement restriction was the British epidemic of
foot-and-mouth disease of 2001, which affected many farms
and businesses and led to the quarantine and slaughter of 4
million sheep, cattle, and pigs for disease control purposes
(17). In all three examples, a decentralized quarantine was
imposed. In general, the advantage of a decentralized strategy
(e.g., persons are restricted to home) is that it may reduce the
risk for transmission of disease because fewer persons congre-
gate. However, a decentralized strategy may require more
community resources to implement and enforce. Alternatively,
the centralized strategy (e.g., restricted persons are taken to a
sports arena, auditorium, theater, school, or hospital) is seem-
ingly easier for the government to care for restricted persons
and to enforce the order but could allow contagious and non-
contagious persons to come into contact with each other. 
Another example of large-scale quarantine occurred in Los
Angeles in 1924 during the last epidemic of pneumonic plague
in this country (12). Three days after the first 15 cases in this
outbreak became known to public health officials, eight city
blocks that housed approximately 2,500 Mexicans were placed
in quarantine. Public health nurses were sent to the area to
make house-to-house inspections to identify new cases, and all
patients with suspected cases in the area were examined by
physicians at the patient’s home and then sent to the county
hospital. The Los Angeles County Board of Charities provided
7-day rations to each household. All persons who lived at
addresses where cases had occurred were quarantined in the
county general hospital, and a Spanish-speaking priest and
social workers were placed in the area to reassure and calm the
residents. The quarantine actions taken in this outbreak were a
combination of centralized and decentralized strategies. 
As has been discussed by Barbera et al. (18), numerous
concerns regarding large-scale quarantine exist. All states cur-
rently have in place varying degrees of legal authority
enabling isolation, quarantine, or travel restrictions if needed
to maintain the welfare and safety of the public. Drafting
restrictive orders in advance is less helpful than with the other
types of orders discussed above because restrictive orders
require more tailoring to the specific circumstances and
parameters of an outbreak. Factors such as duration and loca-
tion of restriction are dependent on what the bioterrorist agent
is, how it is transmitted, how widely the agent has been dis-
seminated, whether exposed persons can be personally identi-
fied, and what resources are available to care for restricted
persons. Not drafting such orders in advance, however, means
that they may be written during the turmoil of multiple agen-
cies trying to control an outbreak. Authorities should never
hesitate to revise the orders on the basis of updated informa-
tion. At the end of the Operation Topoff exercise, for instance,
when the governor had issued a travel restriction order for all
of metropolitan Denver and CDC had quarantined the entire
state of Colorado, such orders created many unforeseen prob-
lems, including how to enforce the orders, maintain essential
community services, and distribute foods and prescription
medicines. The exercise ended before any of these problems
were addressed and resolved. 
Conclusions
Accurate and substantive information given to the public
by credible public health and medical experts can do much to
allay the fears of the public and encourage their cooperation
and participation in constructive, organized community
response efforts (19,20). The foundation for this is thoughtful,
detailed preparations. In this article, I have discussed a number
of ideas about legal and administrative preparations for a biot-
errorist attack, but more work can be done, including develop-
ment of strategies addressing issues related to mental health,
disposal of corpses, performing forensic autopsies, signing
death certificates, and managing potential animal vectors of
disease. 
I have not discussed the sharing of medical and epidemio-
logic information between public health agencies and law
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. Under normal circumstances, public health officials
typically argue that release of disease surveillance information
to the criminal justice system will discourage persons with
reportable conditions from disclosing to public health officials
where they have been and with whom they have had contact.
However, a bioterrorist attack is not a routine event, and I rec-
ommend that state and local public health agencies review the
laws and regulations governing the confidentiality of disease
surveillance records and develop a legal and administrative
protocol for sharing pertinent and relevant information with
law enforcement agencies during a bioterrorist attack (21). 
Finally, I have not discussed the protection of civil liberties
and due process for persons affected by executive orders of the
governor and public health officials. This is an important and
difficult issue, especially when well persons are quarantined
solely on the basis of their having visited, worked, or resided
in a particular location at a particular time, as opposed to hav-
ing had face-to-face contact with a known contagious person.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 245
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Public health officials and attorneys general should review
existing safeguards for the protection of civil liberties and
determine whether modifications need to be made for the spe-
cial circumstances created by a bioterrorist attack.
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